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ABSTRACT
The recently-proposed PassCard scheme enables CardSpace
to be used as a password manager, thereby both improving
the usability and security of passwords as well as encour-
aging CardSpace adoption. However, this scheme does not
work with sites using HTTPS, seriously limiting its practi-
cality. In this paper we extend PassCard to support sites
using both HTTP and HTTPS. Usernames and passwords
are stored in CardSpace personal cards, and these cards can
be used to sign on transparently to corresponding websites.
PassCard does not require any changes to login servers, de-
fault browser security settings or to the CardSpace identity
selector; in particular, it does not require websites to support
CardSpace. PassCard operates with both the CardSpace
and the Higgins identity selectors without any modification.
We describe how this new version of PassCard operates, and
give security and usability analyses.
General Terms
Security
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
The most common means of user authentication remains
the use of passwords, despite their well-known shortcom-
ings. Moreover, as the number of on-line services requiring
passwords continues to grow, users increasingly re-use pass-
words, write them down in insecure ways, and/or employ
passwords which can be readily guessed. The result is an
ever-increasing risk of exposure of passwords to malicious
parties. Passwords could also be stolen [5] through key log-
ging, phishing, sniffing, shoulder surfing, etc.
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A solution that enables the use of site-unique strong pass-
words whilst maintaining user security and privacy is thus
needed. Password managers of various types have been pro-
posed to meet this need. A password manager stores user-
names and passwords and makes them available when re-
quired. Users are not required to remember any passwords
apart from a single master password which can be used to
lock/un-lock the password manager.
CardSpace is a user-friendly tool supporting user authen-
tication. To sign on to a site, a user selects a virtual card,
known as an information card (InfoCard), from an interface
provided by the CardSpace identity selector (or just the se-
lector), instead of providing a username and password.
Despite the introduction of CardSpace (and other similar
systems), the vast majority of websites still use username-
password for authentication, and this is likely to continue
for at least the next few years [5]. One major problem with
CardSpace, and with other similar systems providing more
secure means of user authentication, is that the transition
from username-password is extremely difficult to achieve.
Service providers will not wish to do the work necessary to
support CardSpace if very few users employ it; equally, users
are hardly likely to use CardSpace if it is only supported by
a tiny minority of websites. PassCard is designed to help
overcome this barrier to change by allowing an evolutionary
deployment of CardSpace, initially as a password manager
and subsequently, once users are familiar with its interface,
as a more sophisticated means of user authentication.
In this paper we propose a new version of PassCard. The
goal is to develop a simple and intuitive approach to pass-
word management, transparent to both the selector and re-
lying parties (RPs). Unlike the previous version of Pass-
Card [2] which only supports sites using HTTP, the new
version supports both HTTP and HTTPS-enabled sites.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces CardSpace, and, in section 3, we present
the proposed scheme. Section 4 highlights a number of Pass-
Card features and limitations. Section 5 reviews related
work, and, finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2. CARDSPACE
CardSpace [7] is Microsoft’s implementation of a digital
identity metasystem, in which digital identities are repre-
sented to users as Information Cards (or InfoCards). There
are two types of InfoCards: personal (self-issued) cards and
managed cards, issued by remote IdPs. CardSpace is sup-
ported in Internet Explorer (IE) from version 7 onwards. Ex-
tensions to other browsers, e.g. Firefox and Safari, also exist.
An updated version, CardSpace 2.0 Beta 2, was released, al-
though Microsoft announced in early 2011 that it will not
ship; instead Microsoft released a technology preview of U-
Prove (http://blogs.msdn.com/b/card/archive/2011/02/
15/beyond-windows-cardspace.aspx). We refer through-
out to the CardSpace version that is shipped by default as
part of Windows Vista and Windows 7, that is available as a
free download for XP and Server 2003, and which has been
approved as an OASIS standard [6].
Personal cards are created by users themselves, and the
claims listed in such cards are asserted by the self-issued
identity provider (SIIP) that co-exists with the CardSpace
identity selector. Personal cards can contain claims of 14
editable types, including First Name, Last Name, and Web
Page. We use personal cards to enable CardSpace to func-
tion as a password manager. Hence, we next describe how
the personal card protocol operates [3] (in the case where
the RP does not employ a security token service).
1. User Agent (UA)→ RP. Request: GET (a login page).
2. RP → UA. A login page is returned in which the RP
security policy is embedded.
3. User → UA. The RP page offers the option to use
CardSpace; selecting this option activates the selector,
which is passed the RP policy. If this is the first time
that this RP has been contacted, the selector will dis-
play the identity of the RP and give the user the option
to either proceed or abort the protocol.
4. Selector → User. The selector highlights InfoCards
matching the policy.
5. User → Selector. The user chooses (or creates) a per-
sonal card. The user can preview the card to ensure
that they are willing to release the claim values.
6. Selector 
 SIIP. The selector sends a Request Secu-
rity Token (RST) to the SIIP, which responds with a
Request Security Token Response (RSTR).
7. UA → RP. The RSTR is passed to the UA, which
forwards it to the RP.
8. RP → User. The RP verifies the token, and, if satis-
fied, grants access.
Note that if the visited site uses HTTPS, then the RSTR
message in step 7 (above) will be encrypted using the public
key of the visited site. This explains why the previous ver-
sion of PassCard, which relies on a browser extension that
parses the RSTR, only works with websites using HTTP.
The extension does not have access to the key necessary to
decrypt the RSTR, and hence cannot operate. This issue is
addressed in the revised PassCard scheme described below.
3. PASSCARD
We now describe the operation of the new version of Pass-
Card. The parties involved are an RP, a CardSpace-enabled
UA (e.g. a suitable web browser), an HTTP Server (HS), and
a browser extension implementing the protocol described
in 3.1. The HS is user-selectable, can be any HTTP site,
and is used in a passive manner. The introduction of the HS
addresses the main limitation with the previous version of
PassCard (described at the end of section 2), thus enabling
PassCard to also operate with HTTPS-based websites.
Either prior to, or during, use of PassCard, the user must
first create a special personal card, referred to here as a
PassCard, containing a username and password in certain
card fields, the choice of which is implementation-specific
(e.g. the user could insert their username in the First Name
field and password in the Last Name field). Basic protection
against phishing can be provided if the URL of the target
site is included in the PassCard (e.g. it could be inserted
in the Web Page field). However, this is optional, as users
may wish to use a single PassCard with multiple websites
sharing the same user credentials. For ease of identification,
the user can give the PassCard a meaningful name, e.g. of
the target site. The user can also upload an image for the
PassCard, e.g. containing the logo of the intended site.
3.1 PassCard Operation
We now describe the protocol steps for PassCard. Its
operation differs depending on whether the RP uses HTTP
or HTTPS. We therefore divide the protocol description
into two cases. Protocol steps 1–3b are the same for both
cases, and are described first. Note that the HTTP case is
precisely the same as the previous version of PassCard [2];
we include the description here for completeness.
1. UA → RP. HTTP Request: GET (a login page).
2. RP → UA. (the login page is returned).
3. The browser extension performs the following processes.
(a) It scans the RP page for a form containing a user-
name and password field and a submit button. If
all found, it continues; otherwise it terminates.
(b) It determines the protocol (i.e. HTTP or HTTPS)
in use with the RP.
Execution continues as described in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2,
depending on whether the RP is using HTTP or HTTPS.
3.1.1 HTTP-based PassCard.
Steps 3c–8 (below) apply for HTTP-based RPs.
3. Following step 3b in section 3.1, the browser extension
continues as follows.
(c) It adds CardSpace-enabling tags to the login page,
setting the embedded security policy to require a
token asserting claims of the types in which the
user credentials are stored.
(d) It adds a function to the login page to intercept
the RSTR that will be returned by the selector.
(e) It embeds a PassCard icon to the page, causing it
to appear above the submit button (see Fig. 1).
4. The user clicks on the icon and the selector lights up.
5. The user selects (or creates) and submits a PassCard.
The selector creates and sends an RST to the SIIP,
which responds with an RSTR.
6. The selector passes the RSTR to the browser.
7. The browser extension performs the following tasks.
(a) It intercepts and parses the RSTR.
(b) If the token contains the URL of the target site,
the extension compares it with the URL of the
visited site, and only proceeds if they match.
(c) It extracts the username and password from the
pre-specified fields.
(d) It auto-populates and submits the login form.
8. The RP verifies the credentials and, if satisfied, grants
access.
3.1.2 HTTPS-based PassCard.
Steps 3c–8b (below) apply for HTTPS-enabled RPs.
3. Following step 3b in section 3.1, the browser extension
continues as follows.
(c) It obtains the page’s URL, referred to throughout
as the ‘target URL’.
(d) It causes the PassCard icon to appear above the
submit field, in such a way that clicking it results
in an HTTP redirect.
4. If the user clicks the icon, the browser is redirected
to the pre-specified HS, and the target URL is also
transmitted as a URL query parameter.
5. While interacting with the HS, the browser extension:
(a) adds a ‘hidden’ password login form to the re-
turned HS page, if it does not have one, at which
point steps 3c–3e of section 3.1.1 are executed;
(b) recovers and stores the target URL; and
(c) transparently invokes the selector, at which point
steps 5–7c of section 3.1.1 are executed.
7. The browser extension continues as follows.
(d) It encrypts the username and password values
with a secret key known only to the browser ex-
tension (see section 3.2).
(e) It transparently redirects the user to the target
URL, and the ‘encrypted’ username-password val-
ues are transmitted as URL query parameters.
8. While interacting with the target URL site, the exten-
sion:
(a) recovers and decrypts the username and password
values; and
(b) auto-populates and auto-submits the login form,
after which step 8 of section 3.1.1 is executed.
3.2 Discussion
The PassCard user experience when operating in HTTP
mode is the same as with ‘conventional’ password-based au-
thentication except that, instead of manually entering and
submitting a username and password, the PassCard user se-
lects and submits a virtual card. The user experience in
HTTPS mode is similar to that of HTTP mode, except that
users (depending on their Internet speed, machine speed,
etc.) may or may not experience a redirect from the tar-
get HTTPS site to the HS and vice versa, resulting in the
temporary display of the HS page. Note that, in both Pass-
Card modes, users are not required to click the PassCard
icon more than once or to remember any passwords.
Figure 1: PassCard Icon
Regardless of whether or not an RP already supports
CardSpace, the browser extension will always add the Pass-
Card icon to the RP page, as long as it detects username-
password prompts on the page. Informal tests on the pro-
totype implementation [1] suggest that this will not disrupt
the normal operation of CardSpace. Thus, if an RP supports
CardSpace and simultaneously supports username-password
authentication, the browser extension will still insert the
PassCard icon above the submit button of the password lo-
gin form. In such a case, users can sign on using any of
PassCard, CardSpace or a manually entered password.
The encryption of the username and password in step 7d of
section 3.1.2 is not necessary to prevent channel eavesdrop-
ping, because an SST/TLS channel is already established
between the browser and the target HTTPS site. However,
if the username and password are sent as part of the URL
(as is the case in the PassCard prototype [1]), then, if sent in
plaintext, these values will be vulnerable to shoulder-surfing
attacks, since they will be shown in the browser address bar
(and possibly also in the browser status bar). The prototype
implementation uses a simple symmetric encryption scheme
for this purpose to minimise the overhead.
The HS can be any HTTP site, and is not actively involved
in the protocol except to serve a web page when requested.
It simply acts as a convenient way to avoid the problems
associated with use of CardSpace with an HTTPS-enabled
site. The choice of HS is not particularly security-sensitive
in that it does not learn any sensitive data; it simply learns
that a client at a particular IP address is using PassCard.
The choice of HS is a configuration option in the prototype,
so if the default site is regarded as privacy-threatening then
a user can change it to any trusted site address, e.g. that of
a personal web page.
4. PASSCARD PROPERTIES
4.1 Security and Usability
PassCard takes advantage of the selector, and is supported
by its built-in security features. For example, when invoked,
the selector runs in a separate private desktop session, mit-
igating the risk of other applications, e.g. malware, from
interacting or interfering with it. In addition, all values in-
serted in the fields of a PassCard are stored in encrypted
form on the user machine.
The selector identifies the RP to the user and indicates
whether or not they have visited that RP before; if the user
is visiting this RP for the first time, CardSpace requests the
user’s permission to proceed. This helps to support mutual
authentication since the user and the RP are identified to
each other (a security gain over ‘conventional’ password au-
thentication, where an HTTP-based RP is not identified).
As with any local password manager, PassCard (when
running in HTTP mode) avoids the need for trusted third
parties. In addition, the automatic form-filling feature re-
duces exposure to shoulder-surfing attacks and also helps to
thwart key loggers. PassCard reduces the threat of phishing
attacks involving impersonation of legitimate sites by com-
paring the URL in the PassCard with that of the visited
website. PassCard also supports the use of strong per-site
passwords, since users no longer need to memorise or write
down passwords. PassCard does not require any changes to
the default IE configuration, thereby avoiding potential vul-
nerabilities resulting from lowered browser security settings.
PassCard provides a simple, intuitive user experience via
its use of the selector interface. At the same time, it famil-
iarises users with CardSpace, thereby potentially facilitat-
ing future adoption of more secure means of authentication.
Unlike other password managers which represent credentials
in text form, PassCard credentials are stored in PassCards
which can be equipped with a readily recognisable image.
PassCard operates completely transparently to external
parties, and hence does not require any changes to RPs,
identity selectors or to browser settings. PassCard is also
flexible, since users can choose whether or not to use it sim-
ply by electing to click the PassCard icon (or not). In addi-
tion, it gives flexibility in the choice of the HS when running
in HTTPS mode.
By making use of CardSpace features, PassCard supports
a degree of roaming. A user can transfer PassCards from
one PC to another using the CardSpace backup facilities. If
the CardSpace backup file (which holds data in encrypted
form) is stored on a portable storage medium (e.g. a USB
drive) then full mobility is provided, as well as robustness
in the form of protection against loss of credential data.
4.2 Limitations
An obvious limitation is that anyone with access to a
Windows user account can access the PassCards and use
the stored credentials. This is a fundamental limitation
of CardSpace which, by default, does not impose any ad-
ditional protection on the use of the selector. To address
this issue, we observe that CardSpace allows individual In-
foCards to be PIN-protected, which should be considered for
PassCards stored on machines accessible to other users. It
may also be possible to cause CardSpace to run under UAC
(User Account Control), so that running CardSpace causes
Windows to prompt the user for an administrator password.
In addition, it could be required that, during the process of
user authentication on a PC using CardSpace, a random
and short-lived one-time password is sent to a user’s mobile
device; this must then be entered into the PC by the user
when prompted [4].
The plug-in must scan every browser-rendered web page
to detect whether it supports password authentication, and
this may affect system performance. However, informal tests
on the PassCard prototype [1] suggest that this is not a
serious issue. Also, the plug-in can be configured so that it
only operates with certain sites.
5. RELATEDWORK
Password managers, which store passwords in a (secure)
location either on the user PC or remotely, are now widely
available. They typically store passwords in encrypted form
and, unlike PassCard, require users to use a single master
password to access the password store. Some are also capa-
ble of masking passwords, and others, much like PassCard,
provide automatic password entry. Examples of password
managers include open source schemes such as Password
Safe (passwordsafe.sourceforge.net), KeePass (KeePass.
info), and PINs (http://mirekw.com/winfreeware/pins.
html) as well as commercial products such as RoboForm
(roboform.com), and Any Password (anypassword.com).
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of PassCard is its de-
pendence on CardSpace, whereas most other password man-
agers are independent applications. PassCard can thus ben-
efit from the CardSpace security features, which may give
users greater confidence in its use.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new version of PassCard, which (un-
like its predecessor) supports almost all websites, including
those using HTTPS. Users store their usernames and pass-
words in CardSpace personal cards, and use such cards to
transparently sign on to corresponding websites. PassCard
is based on a browser extension, and is transparent to login
servers, identity selectors, and browser security settings. It
does not require websites to support CardSpace.
The scheme uses the CardSpace identity selector interface
to seamlessly authenticate users to websites. It extends the
use of personal cards to allow for transparent password man-
agement. Such an approach could help to extend the appli-
cability of CardSpace. A full version of this paper, including
a description of a prototype implementation, is available [1].
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